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Abstract
The debate in the UK over whether the voting age should be lowered to 16 has largely 
involved political elites demanding change. Public opinion, insofar as it has been tested at 
UK-wide level, has tended to oppose change for Westminster elections but change has 
proceeded for devolved elections in Scotland and Wales. Drawing upon extensive research 
undertaken as part of a two-year Leverhulme Trust project on the voting age debate, this 
article tests public opinion via quantitative surveys on whether the voting age should be 
lowered for UK-wide elections not only among the existing electorate but also among 16-17 
year olds. It suggests three things: One, there has been a shift among adults towards support 
for change, but not an outright majority in favour. Two, the insulation of public opinion from 
the debate is likely to diminish as only a change in attitudes appears capable of eliciting 
change at UK level. Three, the divisions on the issue among the public map onto the 
importance of age as a variable in party choice, with younger Labour supporters most in 
favour of Votes-at-16 and older Conservatives most opposed. This political partisanship was 
absent when the UK became the first country in the world to lower the voting age from 21 to 
18 half-a-century ago but is likely to dominate the Votes-at-16 debate for years to come.






























































Public Opinion, Political Partisanship and the Votes-at-16 debate in the UK 
1. Introduction 
The proposition that the voting age should be lowered to 16 for some or all elections across 
the United Kingdom (UK) has become an increasingly salient political issue.  Advocates and 
opponents of Votes-at-16 have typically framed arguments for or against the policy in terms 
of normative democratic principles (Cowley and Denver 2004, Folks 2004), or arguments 
related to young people’s perceived levels of maturity on a number of relevant (and 
sometimes irrelevant) dimensions (Gibson and Hamilton 2013, Healy and Malhotra 2013, 
Champion 2014). The role of public opinion is however peripheral in such debates, possibly 
because the general public has appeared substantially opposed but largely apathetic towards 
the issue (Chan and Clayton 2006; Birch et al. 2014). This has led some to argue that the 
bespoke and partial lowering of the voting age across the UK has – thus far - been largely 
driven by political elites in a ‘top-down’ manner, with scant acknowledgement of, or reference 
to, the views of the general public (Loughran et al. 2019).  
 
The primary aim and focus of this article is to explain the underlying drivers of public attitudes 
towards the voting age. In doing so it addresses the absence of detailed academic 
consideration of the development of public opinion on voting age reform, including - for the 
first time – an exploration of the underlying attitudes driving support among 16-17 year olds. 
The article first presents a comprehensive overview of the (somewhat intermittent) public 
opinion polling on the voting age over the last two decades to identify trends in public opinion 
on the issue. We seek to explore whether public support for lowering the voting age has 
changed in parallel with the growing policy traction it has achieved amongst a majority of 
political parties in the UK (with the significant exceptions of the Conservative and Democratic 
Unionist parties) and within the devolved governments in Scotland and Wales. It will then 
present evidence from two parallel surveys (n1000) run by Survation in October 2018, as part 
of the quantitative element of our Leverhulme Trust two-year research project, Lowering the 






























































Voting Age in the UK 1. These two surveys drew on nationally representative samples of the 
UK electorate aged 18 or over, and 16-17 year-olds who were either partially enfranchised or 
not franchised, depending on where they lived in the UK.  Both surveys capture levels of 
support for Votes-at-16 alongside related attitudes such as perceptions of adulthood and 
views on political education as well as more standard demographic indicators. This enables 
us to specify a series of logistic regression models that explore the underlying drivers of voting 
age support focusing on whether demographic or attitudinal factors provide a stronger 
explanation of public attitudes on the issue and whether this is congruent with the arguments 
made by those on either side of the Votes-at-16 debate. 
The results from our surveys suggest that there is overwhelming public support for lowering 
the voting age among 16-17 year-olds. We also find that support for the policy appears to 
have increased among those over the age of 18, to the point where there is an almost equal 
division between supporters and opponents of change.  However, our multivariate analysis of 
the underlying drivers of support for Votes-at-16 highlights important tensions for 
consideration by advocates and opponents. Within both our samples, support for lowering the 
voting age appears directly related to the increasingly partisan nature of the issue, which 
mirrors wider age-related and ideological divisions apparent in British politics. In 
demonstrating that public attitudes towards Votes-at-16 have moved from apathetic 
scepticism to partisan polarisation, the paper concludes by arguing that public opinion will 
likely play a more significant role in debates about voting age reform. 
 
2. Public Opinion and Voting Age Reform 
According to Simon and Jerit (2007, 256), the role of public opinion in the policy-making 
process has been traditionally seen as instrumental both in influencing politicians’ policy 
priorities and outcomes. They note, however, that opinion is seen as increasingly irrelevant 






























































by contemporary ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who pursue their own policy agendas irrespective of 
whether overall support is immediately apparent. They conclude however that public opinion 
can still be important in helping to frame policy debates, both in terms of understanding the 
motivations and expectations of the general public on some issues.  
 
The lack of significant resonance or impact of public opinion on lowering the voting age is, in 
part, due to how advocates and opponents have shaped the parameters of debate about the 
issue. It is somewhat understandable that supporters of voting age reform have chosen to 
overlook public opinion, as surveys over the past decade or so have regularly indicated a 
majority of over-18s are opposed. More surprisingly considering the nature of their cause, 
opponents of lowering the voting age have also proven reluctant to use supportive public 
opinion evidence to strengthen their point of objection. The merits or otherwise of voting age 
reform have thus most often been contended in abstract and normative terms, with scant 
regard for popular opinion on the issue.  
 
Two inter-related perspectives have instead been dominant in debates about Votes-at-16 
(Loughran et al. 2019). The first focuses on political socialisation, with supporters and 
opponents disagreeing on when young people can (or cannot) be considered to have 
developed the necessary political maturity and social capital to vote effectively (Healy and 
Malhotra 2013, McAllister 2014; Quintelier 2013). Both academic and public discussion on 
this issue has been often framed in terms of the relationship between the age of 
enfranchisement and other thresholds of adult responsibility. The legitimacy or otherwise of 
16-17 year-olds to join the electorate is thus founded on disputes about transitions to 
adulthood, evidenced by young people’s political literacy and life experience – or lack thereof 
(Bergh 2013, Wagner et al. 2012, Degerman 2014). It is noteworthy that, while political and 
academic debate has become mired in repetitive arguments over the definition and 
parameters of ‘adulthood’, the shared underlying assumption is that the right to vote is 
exclusive to adult citizens.   































































The second perspective is a more instrumentally-orientated argument related to the political 
incentivisation of young people to participate in electoral processes and the impact this may 
have on the democratic health of the country (Folkes, 2004; Franklin, 2004; Berry, 2014; Henn 
and Oldfield, 2016). Proponents of voting age reform argue it could prove an effective 
mechanism for improving overall turnout rates at elections by encouraging young people to 
develop the habit of voting while still in a stable home environment (Franklin, 2004; Plutzer, 
2002). Conversely, opponents raise instrumental concerns that lowering the voting age will 
lead to a further decline in overall turnout rates contributing to the long-term erosion of 
democratic legitimacy (Denver and Cowley, 2004, Chan and Clayton, 2006).   
 
Some advocates of voting age reform have sought to reframe this second perspective around 
the principle of giving young people greater voice in the political process (Bowman, 2015, 
Peto, 2018). This reflects an urgent need for younger people to have a stronger collective 
influence on the political process in order to re-balance democratic systems which 
increasingly favour older citizens and alienate the young from democratic institutions 
(Runciman, 2018). The emphasis on the importance of increasing ‘youth voice’ in the political 
process thus largely rejects the necessity of the link between enfranchisement and adulthood 
that has traditionally framed the debate. However, claims that young people seek greater 
voice in the political system through voting age reform, or the extent to which these aims are 
shared by the electorate as a whole, have lacked robust and sustained empirical support.
Birch et al., (2014) provide the most substantial analysis of public opinion thus far. Drawing 
on data from a 2013 Yougov survey, they found substantial public opposition to Votes-at-16 
among the electorate. This noted, they identified that younger (but not the youngest) voters 
and members of working-class groups were more likely to support lowering the voting age. 
Interestingly, support for the policy was only weakly predicted by broader political attitudes, 
identities and preferences. This led them to conclude that the electorate’s attitude to the voting 






























































age was one of sceptical apathy and to predict that this would result in any move towards 
Votes-at-16 in the UK being driven by elite level policy interests rather than public pressure. 
This prediction has – thus far - proven correct. 
 
Developments in UK politics, particularly the 2016 EU referendum and its aftermath, suggest 
that support for Votes-at-16 may have become more rooted in underlying divisions connected 
to political socialisation and partisan politics (Jennings and Lodge, 2019). This rise in salience 
of Votes-at-16 in UK politics can be linked to the emergence of a distinctive ‘politics of age’ 
(Harrison, 2018; Pickard, 2018). Generational schisms are increasingly resonant, and are 
founded on a clash of values which, it is argued, are related to differing transition to adulthood 
experiences and diverse responses to the impact of globalisation (Jennings and Stoker, 2017; 
Prosser et al., 2018; Sloam and Henn, 2018). Scholars exploring these issues often contrast 
a well-educated, socially liberal, and cosmopolitan group of primarily younger voters with a 
less-educated, socially conservative, and communitarian group of primarily older voters 
(Dalton and Welzel, 2014; Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Furlong, 2019, Goodhart, 2017; Jennings 
and Stoker, 2017; Norris, 2011).  
 
Jennings and Stoker (2017) emphasise the importance of geography in structuring this 
generational division. They highlight divergence between vibrant urban hubs where university 
educated younger people study, settle, and engage enthusiastically in democratic politics, 
and post-industrial areas in which groups, including young people, feel ‘left behind’ and 
politically alienated. Such divisions raise questions as to the universality of claims that 
lowering the voting age might prove an effective mechanism - on its own - for addressing 
widespread youth disengagement in politics (cf. Bowman, 2015; McAllister et al, 2017).  
Surridge (2010, 2016) has identified education as being the key mechanism driving the 
evolution of new values-based class divisions in UK politics. Recent work by Sobolewska and 
Ford (2020) also demonstrates strong educational divides underpinning critical socio-cultural 
fault lines in UK politics and society.  However, Surridge (2016) also demonstrates that the 






























































effect of education is nuanced and non-linear with University education having the strongest 
educational impact in increasing liberal values.  It therefore seems highly plausible that having 
a degree would be strongly correlated with increased support for lowering the voting age to 
16.
Research indicates that the 2014 Scottish independence referendum had positive short-term 
effects on the engagement and attitudes towards politics of 16-17 year-olds of all social 
classes (Huebner and Eichhorn 2020). There was however uncertainty to the extent this was 
a product of enfranchisement or the unique experience of the referendum. It is yet to be 
proven if one of the effects of Votes-at-16 could be the further empowerment of engaged 
young people with existing high levels of political capital, or if it universally addresses the 
underlying causes of political apathy and alienation.
Age has also proven more influential in explaining partisan divisions in UK electoral politics. 
For example, age proved the strongest demographic predictor of vote choice in the Scottish 
independence referendum of 2014 (Eichhorn, 2017), the 2016 EU referendum and the UK 
General Elections of 2017 and 2019 (Curtice, 2017; YouGov 2019). Age cleavages have also 
further disrupted the traditional class-based loyalties of party support (Evans and Mellon 
2016). The proponents of the so-called ‘Youthquake’ thesis associated with the 2017 UK 
General Election present evidence that inter- and intra-generational schisms are increasingly 
founded on ideological difference. Henn and Sloam (2018) note the emergence of a millennial 
generation of ‘young cosmopolitans’ who share strong liberal and left-wing attitudes towards 
social and economic issues. They highlight links between the increased turnout rate among 
18-24 year-olds in 2017 and the rise in electoral support for the Labour party. Pickard (2018) 
concurs, noting the emergence of a ‘do-it-ourselves’ generation who are politically literate and 
engaged, and who participate widely in diverse forms of activism. These young people are 






























































critical of mainstream politics and support its reform via policy interventions such as Votes-at-
16.
Indeed, the opposition of right-wing parties to Votes-at-16, particularly the governing 
Conservative party, may well be grounded in sound electoral reasoning. An Office for National 
Statistics (2017) study identified 88 constituencies in the 2017 UK general election where the 
number of 16 and 17 year-olds was greater than the winning margin. The study noted a 
potential for change in the outcome of results in these constituencies if Votes-at-16 was 
introduced which would disproportionately hit the Conservatives. This noted, a small but 
growing number of Conservative elected representatives have indicated their support for 
voting age reform (Electoral Reform Society, 2019). Alternatively, centre and left-leaning 
political parties in different parts of the UK have proven increasingly keen to express their 
support for voting age reform, possibly expecting an electoral dividend from younger voters 
in return (Loughran et al., 2019). Such optimism may well be misplaced. Evidence of the 
effects of lowering the voting age in Scotland and Austria have shown it is erroneous to 
assume that 16-17 year-olds will exhibit similar electoral behaviour to 18-24 year olds, or that 
their party preferences will be easily predicted (Eichhorn, 2017; Zeglovits and Aichholzer, 
2014, Zeglovits and Zandonella, 2013).   
  
The increasing salience of age as a political cleavage in UK politics has the potential to 
enhance the importance of public opinion in the voting age debate in the UK. Put another 
way, it might be expected that public support and opposition to Votes-at-16 will have moved 
on from the apathetic scepticism identified by Birch et al. (2014). Due to the increasingly 
partisan nature of the ‘politics of age’, it is reasonable to hypothesise that public opinion on 
Votes-at-16 has become more rooted in emerging cultural and ideological cleavages. If that 
is the case, we would expect political partisanship to have a stronger impact in differentiating 
supporters from opponents than has been demonstrated in previous studies.  Accordingly, 
we would also expect lowering the voting age to appeal to younger, university educated, left 






























































leaning, socially liberal and politically interested groups, while opponents are likely to be older, 
non-university educated, right-leaning and less politically engaged. Overall, we think it is 
realistic to expect that support for Votes-at-16 will have an endogenous relationship with the 
increasing significance of age as a differentiator of political preferences in the UK. 
 
3. Trends in UK public opinion towards the voting age (2003-2017) 
(Insert Figure 1 Here)
Figure 1.  Levels of Support for Lowering the Voting in the UK 2003-2017 (%) 2 
Methodologically rigorous surveys of UK public opinion on ‘Votes at 16’ have been carried out 
with moderate frequency since the early 2000s. Yet tracking the development of public opinion 
has also proven challenging in at least three important ways that raise questions regarding 
the utility of longitudinal analysis. First, surveys have only sought to assess public opinion on 
the voting age question intermittently, usually prior to or in the aftermath of a significant 
electoral event. Second, surveys undertaken have lacked consistency in terms their sampling. 
For example, while some were based on UK-wide sampling, others focused on discrete sub-
state national populations. Age cohorts also proved variable, with some engaging with adults 
over the age of 18, while others focused on younger cohorts that occasionally included non-
enfranchised young people. Third, surveys have rarely used the same question wording and 
response options, thus producing some variability in outcome. Greenwood (2019) notes that 
the positive or negative framing of survey questions on the issue have a demonstrable impact 
on levels of support. As such, ‘extending’ the vote to 16-17 year-olds typically garners more 
support than ‘reducing’ the age of enfranchisement.  The collation and charting of the varied 
polling evidence highlighting levels of support for Votes-at-16 from the NOP/HTV Wales 2003 
survey to just prior to the 2017 UK general election (Figure 1) reveals the changing nature of 
public opinion over the period across a number of different populations.






























































Initial surveys were linked to the increased political resonance of voting age reform as a 
measure for addressing the sharp decline in youth turnout at the 2001 election. The first 
survey, conducted in Wales in March 2003 for HTV Wales, saw nearly three-quarters of those 
polled (73%) oppose lowering the voting age. A survey commissioned by the Electoral 
Commission in November 2003, as part of their consideration of the voting age question, also 
saw only 22% of those polled support Votes-at-16. In both cases, opposition was strongest 
amongst older voters. It is noteworthy that a boost to the Electoral Commission survey sample 
of 234 15 to 19 year-olds also found a majority (54%) favoured the voting age remaining at 
18. However, a further relevant survey conducted with over 2,000 11 to 18 year-olds as part 
of Nestlé’s Family Monitor research series saw 60% of respondents support lowering voting 
age below 18.  
There is then a gap in polling data on the voting age until the Labour government’s 
establishment of the Youth Citizenship Commission (YCC) in 2008 whose brief included a 
review of the voting age. This stimulated further survey of public opinion. The Citizenship 
Foundation commissioned a survey in 2009 which indicated that less than one-third of 14-25-
year-olds polled (31%) supported Votes-at-16. However, in the same year a YCC-
commissioned survey of 1,114 young people aged between 11 and 25 revealed a slight 
plurality (by 3%) in favour of lowering the voting age to 16. In both surveys, age once again 
had an impact on public attitudes. While most participants aged between 11-18 favoured 
lowering the voting age to 16, those aged between 19 and 25 were opposed.  
 
The decision to lower the voting age for the 2014 Scottish independence referendum 
stimulated more frequent polling of public opinion, which indicated a strengthening of views 
on the issue. In 2012, a YouGov survey of Scottish voters over the age of 18 saw 36% of 
respondents express support for the decision to allow 16-17 year-olds vote in the 
independence referendum (and 35% support the universal lowering across the UK). Public 






























































support for Votes-at-16 grew in Scotland during the 2014 campaign, with an Electoral 
Commission/ICM survey held immediately after the referendum indicating that 60% supported 
its universal adoption. The extent to which Scottish voters supported lowering the voting age 
was however strongly influenced by their views on the independence question, with ‘Yes’ 
voters twice as likely to support the measure than their ‘No’ voting counterparts.  
 
Public support for Votes-at-16 across the rest of the UK also observed a trend of increased, 
if variable, backing for lowering the voting age, rising from around 20% to between 30-40% 
(depending on how the question was asked). This suggests that the Scottish referendum 
significantly increased the saliency of Votes-at-16 as a wider issue in British politics. The lead-
up to the 2016 EU referendum stimulated further discussion of ‘Votes at 16’. However, the 
refusal of the UK government to countenance its introduction ensured that the limited survey 
work undertaken focused on the attitudes of 16-17 year-olds regarding EU membership rather 
than public opinion on voting age reform (Renwick and McCay, 2015). 
Public opinion featured in evidence-gathering by the Welsh Assembly in considering whether 
the voting age should be lowered to 16 for local and national elections. In 2015, it held a 
consultation which, though not designed as a methodologically robust statistical exercise, saw 
over 10,000 young people from across Wales aged 11-25 participate, with 53% supporting 
lowering the voting age. An Expert Panel, formed in 2017 to undertake a review of evidence, 
noted in its final report that public opinion had consistently shown ‘limited support for a 
reduction’ but that it was an issue of low salience which may well change over time (McAllister 
et al., 2017: 195). A further consultative and not necessarily representative survey held in 
2018 saw 60% of those who responded support Votes-at-16. It would thus appear that the 
decision to lower the voting age in Wales is following a familiar path to that in Scotland, with 
public opinion slowly shifting in line with the implementation of voting age reform. It was less 
clear however if voting age reform in Scotland and Wales had impacted upon public opinion 






























































concerning lowering the voting age for Westminster elections. The next part of this article 
seeks to engage with this proposition by analysing polling undertaken as part of the 





4.1. Data and Methodology   
In order to investigate the levels of support for Votes-at-16 among both the enfranchised 
electorate and young people, we commissioned two surveys from Survation. The first was a 
standard representative cross-section of the population aged 18 or over drawn from 
Survation’s online panel. The second was drawn from Survation’s special online panel of 16-
17 year-olds. This allows us to compare levels and sources of support for Votes-at-16 among 
the electorate with that of the intended beneficiaries of the policy – a survey approach not 
previously applied. The surveys were administered online and fielded between 10th and 22nd 
October 2018. The over-18s population survey had a final n of 1,009 and the 16-17 year olds 
survey had an n of 1,031. Results were weighted on key demographic variables and questions 
related to vote-choice by Survation to take account of differential response rates from the 
panel participants.  See Appendix Table 1 (16 and 17 year-old Sample) and Appendix Table 
2 (Electorate Sample) for full details of the demographic breakdown of the samples (both 
weighted and unweighted).
The sample of over-18s was a generally accurate representation of the electorate with a slight 
over-representation of female respondents and an under-representation of over 65s and 
retired people. The targets for the weights were derived from Office for National Statistics 
Census Data and the results of the 2017 UK General Election. While the under-representation 
of older respondents has long been acknowledged as a feature of internet panel surveys, we 
do recognise that this slightly biases our adult sample in the direction of those groups who we 






























































would expect to be more supportive of voting age reform (Sturgis et al. 2016).  For the sample 
of 16-17 year olds, data were weighted to the profile of all adults in the UK aged 16-17 by 
age, sex and region derived from Office for National Statistics Census Data. As previously 
noted, levels of support for lowering the voting age are sensitive to differences of question 
wording (Greenwood, 2019). With this in mind, we used the more neutral ‘oppose/support’ 
framing of the voting age question as the dependent variable in our surveys. This is more 
consistent with previous surveys and avoids potential endogeneity problems with other civic 
rights-based questions that featured in our survey questions. 
Following Birch, et al. (2014), we sought to capture the strength of feeling towards the voting 
age issue. Response options were thus aggregated on a Likert scale3. Standard demographic 
variables were included for age, gender, education, household income and employment. To 
these we also added UK region given the variation that now exists in voting age legislation in 
Scotland and Wales. The surveys also included a bank of standard political questions related 
to the respondent’s levels of political interest, political trust, turnout intention and party vote 
choice preferences. A series of questions were designed to probe respondent attitudes to 
some of the core arguments in the voting age debate, such as those associated with attitudes 
towards youth transitions to adulthood, rights and responsibilities, political literacy, and 
engagement. To assess the association between partisan advantage and support for lowering 
the voting age, we asked respondents which party they thought would most benefit from 
change.   
 
In order to highlight key differences in the level and support for Votes-at-16 between the two 
surveys, we begin our analysis by comparing the key descriptive statistics and bivariate 
relationships, followed by the results of the multivariate analysis. Consistent with the previous 
analysis carried out by Birch et al. (2014), we have applied standard binomial logistic 
regression treating support for lowering the voting age as dichotomous.  Similar (though not 






























































quite identical) models are applied to the analysis of both samples to assess and compare 
drivers for the support or opposition of lowering the voting age among over-18s than among 
16-17 year-olds. We are aware of the substantial literature highlighting the challenges of 
comparing effect sizes in logistic regression models run on different samples (Hosmer et al. 
1997, Mood 2010). However, in this instance we are not interested in comparing the absolute 
size of the effects. Our approach is primarily exploratory; we are interested in whether these 
effects achieve statistical significance in both samples.  We believe that comparing these 
models is therefore valid. 
4.2. Descriptive Results  
Our survey of 16-17 year-olds found a substantial majority (71%) in support of Votes-at-16, 
of whom 40% were strongly in favour. In contrast only 12% were opposed to lowering the 
voting age to 16 (see Table 1). The more surprising finding is that we also found a narrow 
plurality (42% to 38%) in support of voting age reform among those aged 18 or over.  This is 
the first time that a representative survey of the UK electorate has shown evidence of majority 
support for lowering the voting age. Moreover, our survey used the more conservative framing 
of the voting age question, which has in past surveys garnered less support.   
 
We treat this latter finding with a degree of scepticism, as online political surveys have 
tendencies towards oversampling groups among whom we would expect to be more 
sympathetic towards Votes-at-16 – such as younger and more politically engaged citizens 
(Sohlberg et al., 2017).  This noted, our findings reflect recent trends in UK public opinion, 
which indicate an increase in support for Votes-at-16. In order to explore whether our findings 
are a product of a strengthening of public opinion on the issue in the wake of recent major 
electoral events or a product of our sampling strategy, in the next section we explore our 
survey data in more depth. 
(Insert Table 1 Here)






























































Table 1. Comparing support for Votes-at-16 (%) among the survey sample of 16-17 
year-olds with the 18+ electorate sample
4.3. Bivariate analysis  
 
Figure 2 demonstrates how support for lowering the voting age varies according to key 
demographic indicators in both the representative sample of the electorate and the sample of 
16-17 year-olds. As with previous surveys, there is a clear relationship between age and 
voting age attitudes, with younger respondents considerably more supportive than older ones. 
Contrary to Birch et al. (2014), our surveys find that support for Votes-at-16 by age follows a 
linear rather than curvilinear pattern. While Birch et al. (2014) found that support for Votes-at-
16 peaked among voters in their 20s and early 30s, our survey finds a strikingly linear pattern 
across both surveys. Neither of our surveys finds significant variation in support for lowering 
the voting age by gender.  
(Insert Figure 2 Here)
Figure 2. Percentage variation in support (compared to overall sample 
average) for lowering the voting age by Demographic variables in both the 
16-17 year-olds and 18+ electorate surveys
There are interesting regional effects in the over-18s survey which might possibly indicate that 
the fallout from the Brexit referendum and its variation in voting according to age impacted 
upon public opinion. A second referendum was still a live issue during the period of our survey.  
As examples of regional variation, 25% more over-18s support Votes-at-16 in London than 
the national average, while there is significantly less support in the East Midlands (11% lower), 
the North East (7% lower) and the Eastern region (7% lower) 4.  Surprisingly though, we found 
no evidence of greater support for Votes-at-16 in Scotland. There is increased support among 
those who are in full time (10% higher) and part-time (9% higher) work and, unsurprisingly, 
far less support among the retired (27% lower). There is also initial evidence of an education 
effect with the level of support rising among those with higher qualifications; with 13% less 






























































support among those with no qualifications to 10% more support among those with a degree 
although these differences are more moderate than might be expected relative to other 
factors.
 
In contrast, while we find no regional difference in the 16-17 year-olds sample for London, we 
find a similar decrease in levels of support in the Eastern English region (8% lower), and near 
unanimous support for lowering the voting age among Scottish respondents. Overall, the 
descriptive findings from our surveys provide relatively convincing initial evidence that support 
for Votes-at-16 maps onto the demographic factors previously identified as underlying the 
‘Cosmopolitan-Communitarian’ divide (Jennings and Stoker, 2017; Sloam and Henn, 2018). 
 
However, as demonstrated in Figure 3, the strongest bivariate relationships we identify are 
attitudinal. Support for Votes-at-16 among the electorate sample is clearly differentiated by 
partisanship with 71% of Labour voters and 61% of Liberal Democrat voters supporting 
lowering the voting age compared with 26% of Conservative voters. This partisan divide is 
less pronounced amongst 16-17 year-olds, with Labour supporters showing only 6% higher 
support than the average with Conservative supporters being 6% lower than the average. 
This means that, while the variation in levels of support by partisan leanings is 45% within the 
electorate, it is only 12% among 16-17 year olds.
(Insert Figure 3 Here)
Figure 3. Percentage variation in support (compared to overall sample 
average) for lowering the voting age by attitudinal variables in both the 16-17 
year-olds and 18+ electorate surveys
Support for lowering the voting age also varies by levels of maturity and efficacy that 
respondents perceive young people to possess. Those in the over-18s sample who believed 
that young people understood politics (37% higher than the average), possessed civic duty 
(17% higher than the average) and thought voting could change things (23% higher than the 
average) were more much more likely to support lowering the voting age. Conversely, those 






























































with less faith in young people’s civic capacities offered some of the lowest levels of support. 
Within the sample of 16-17 year-olds, perceptions of young people’s level of political 
understanding made a significant difference, with those who doubted their peers’ political 
knowledge 27% less likely than average to support Votes-at-16.  
 
With regards to other political characteristics, we found that intention to vote had little relation 
to support for Votes-at-16 in either survey. However, levels of personal political interest had 
one of the strongest relationships within the over-18s cohort, with support for those interested 
in politics 37% higher than the overall average, while support was 28% lower than the average 
among those not interested in politics. Crucially this large differential in levels of support by 
political interest is also reflected in the sample of 16-17 year-olds, with almost unanimous 
support for lowering the voting age among the most politically interested, while support is 20% 
lower than the average among those not interested. 
 
In order to explore how respondents linked the voting age with other minimum ages we asked 
several questions in the surveys. In both samples, those who thought 16 should be considered 
the age of maturity were, unsurprisingly, almost unanimous in support of Votes-at-16. Those 
who thought adulthood began at 21 were much less likely to support voting age reform. 
Interestingly, those favouring 18 as the age of maturity were only slightly less likely to support 
lowering the voting age than the sample average. This means that a significant number of 
respondents – including a majority of 16-17 year-olds - saw 18 as the age of adulthood but 
nevertheless favoured lowering the voting age to 16. This disaggregation of the age of 
adulthood from enfranchisement is significant as it indicates that sizeable numbers reject a 
central objection of those opposed to Votes-at-16 – namely that 16-17 year-olds should not 
be given the vote as they are not considered ‘adults’.  
 
In order to explore why support for lowering the voting age does not seem as directly 
connected to perceptions of the age of maturity as might be expected, we also examined 






























































respondent attitudes to other ages of responsibility. We identified three types of age 
minimums which are often used to frame the Votes-at-16 debate; civic and social rights (age 
of jury service, electoral candidacy, and access to welfare benefits); protective rights (alcohol, 
gambling, military service); and autonomous rights (age of driving, mortgage, and renting). 
We created three basic binary variables to measure respondents support for lowering any of 
the age-related rights in our samples. Respondents who selected any of the relevant 
minimums would be given a value = 1 for that type (‘civic’, ‘protective’ or ‘autonomous’) while 
those who selected none would be given a value = 0.  
 
Figure 2 demonstrates there is an interesting difference in the way in which the over-18s and 
16-17 year-old samples relate the age of enfranchisement to other age minimums.  Among 
the over-18s sample, support for Votes-at-16 seems to be consistent with support for a 
recalibration of other ages of responsibility. For example, 85% of those who support Votes-
at-16 also support lowering at least some other civic, protective or autonomous rights to 16.  
Within the 16-17-year-olds sample, support for voting age reform is substantially higher 
among those who also want to lower other civic minimums (85%) when compared to those 
who support lowering protective (75%) or autonomous age minimums (69%). This represents 
substantial variation in levels of support for Votes-at-16 given the high levels of overall support 
in the 16-17 year-olds sample, providing qualified evidence that young people are perceiving 
the voting age in terms of defining their civic rights rather than a marker of adulthood.   
 
4.4. Logistic Regression Analysis
 
By running a binomial logistic regression, we were able assess the strength and nature of the 
relationship between these variables in predicting support for Votes-at-16 within both 
samples. Support for Votes-at-16 was treated as a binary dependent variable with support 
coded as 1 and all other values coded as 0. The model building strategy adopted a block 
entry approach with four stages (3 stages for the 16/17 year old sample). The first stage 






























































represents the demographic variables including binary dummy variable for gender and having 
a household income above £50,000 as well as a series of categorical variables for housing 
status (reference category: private rent), highest qualification level (reference category: 
GCSE), and region (reference category: East of England)5. One of the limitations of carrying 
out the survey at the individual, rather than household level, means that the number of 
demographic indicators for the 16-17 year olds sample are significantly lower and the data 
regarding type of home and income levels unreliable. As such, we experienced a majority of 
‘don’t know’ responses. Therefore, in the model of the 16-17 year-old sample, age is included 
as a demographic variable in stage 1 of the model building process (whereas it is added as a 
final control and potential mediator in the 4th model of the electorate sample analysis).
The second model introduces the personal political attitudes with standard measures used 
for political trust (based on a 10-point scale from 0=No Trust at all to 10=Complete Trust) and 
political interest (measured on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 = Not at all interested to 5 = Very 
Interested). We also include a series of binary dummy variables capturing vote choice in the 
2017 General Election for the major UK parties (in the youth sample this is ‘support for’ rather 
than ‘vote’) and turnout (in the youth sample this is a 10-point ‘likelihood to vote’ scale).  The 
second model also introduces the ages of responsibility typology we created above to 
measure the effect of support for lowering civic, protective and autonomous rights minimums 
on attitudes to ‘Votes - at-16’. Each of these are coded as dummy variables.  The third model 
introduces the variables related to perceived political competencies of young people.  These 
are binary variables for whether respondents believe young people understand politics, have 
a sense of civic duty and believe that voting can produce change (efficacy assessment).  
Finally, there is a fourth and final stage for the Electorate sample as we introduce age and 
age2 into the model to see if this has a moderating effect on the predictive strength of other 
variables in the model and to test if the curvilinear relationship we observed in the bi-variate 
analysis holds.






























































(Insert Table 2 and Table 3 Here)
Table 2. Binomial Logistic Regression Models of Support for Lowering the Voting Age 
(18+ electorate sample) 
Table 3. Binomial Logistic Regression Models of Support for Lowering the Voting Age 
(16-17 year-old sample)
 Tables 2 and 3 present the co-efficient results from the logistic regression analysis.  These 
tables report the substantively relevant and statistically significant findings from the model (for 
the complete regression results please see Appendix Table 3 and Table 4). Beginning with 
the over-18s sample, there are some interesting confounding influences in the demographic 
relationships. There is a strong initial positive effect on support for Votes-at-16 among those 
who live in London (1.213) and those with a higher level of household income (.250).  This is 
contrasted with a significant negative effect for home ownership (-.374). The model- building 
process shows that this effect is a result of home ownership being a proxy for other factors in 
the model, as it ceases to be a significant predictor beyond the demographics only model.  
We also find that having a university degree has an initial positive effect on support for the 
voting age (.396), but there is no effect for gender. The effects for living in London and having 
a degree become non-significant once the attitudinal variables are entered in the second and 
third models. So while the demographic model is consistent with the findings of Surridge 
(2016) on the influence of University education as a driver of liberal attitudes, this relationship 
ceases to hold and education overall has a surprisingly minor influence in our models with its 
effect dampened by other factors.
The second and third models are critical for demonstrating that support for Votes-at-16 is 
primarily influenced by respondents’ own political attitudes and perception of young people’s 
level of political competence. Partisanship emerges as having the strongest and most robust 
association with support for lowering the voting age, with strong effects for Labour (.657), 
Liberal Democrat (.516) and SNP (1.440) support when added in the second model that, with 
the exception of the Liberal Democrat effect, are only partially mediated in the third and fourth 






























































models.  Level of personal political interest also has a strong association with support for 
lowering the voting age (.250) when added in second model and remains a strong robust 
effect in the third and fourth models.   
 
Support for the lowering of ages of responsibility related to other civic rights has a strong 
effect in the models. We also identify support for lowering ages of autonomous rights as 
having a significant association with support for Votes-at-16 (.303) in the second model but 
not for protection minimums, although this effect disappears in models three and four.  The 
introduction of the attitudinal measures sees the predictive power of the model jump from an 
R2 of 0.057 in model 1 to 0.420 in model 2 (using the more conservative Cox and Snell R2 
measure). There are also strong positive significant effects for perceptions of young people’s 
sense of efficacy (.892) and levels of political understanding (1.585) that are introduced in the 
third model. These attitudinal effects are not simply a proxy for intergenerational divisions as 
they remain significant once age is introduced in the final model.  The effect of the standard 
age variable is negative and significant (-.027) while the age2 variable is non-significant 
showing there is no evidence of a curvilinear relationship.  This provides confirmation of the 
bi-variate findings that support for Votes-at-16 declines according to age. Overall, the analysis 
therefore supports our hypothesis that contemporary attitudes to Votes-at-16 among the 
electorate are strongly shaped by partisan political affiliations. 
There are also interesting contrasts in the drivers of support within the 16-17 year-olds 
sample. Rising age has a strong negative impact on the level of support for Votes-at-16 (-
.409) and although it ceases to be significant once other factors are added to the model. 
However, it still provides evidence that even among 16-17 year-olds, there is an age effect, 
with 17 year-olds being significantly less likely to support lowering the voting age than 16 
year-olds (controlling for other demographic factors). This adds further evidence that 
contemporary support for lowering the voting age has a linear relationship to age.






























































There are also interesting regional effects in the demographic Model 1 for the 16-17 year-olds 
with those in Scotland (.796) and the North West (.798) being significantly more likely to be 
supportive of Votes-at-16 but, surprisingly, there is no effect for this living in London and the 
regional effects cease to be significant once the attitudinal indicators are entered into the 
models. As with the over-18s sample, political interest has a consistent positive effect on 
support for Votes-at-16 (0.398) when introduced in model two and remains a strong predictor 
in Model 3. Likelihood to vote also has a consistent positive significant effect on support for 
Votes-at-16 among 16-17 year-olds. Support for Labour has a significant association with 
support for Votes-at-16 (.460) and which remains in Model 3. The lack of effect for Liberal 
Democrat and SNP partisanship is likely explained by the low number of supporters in the 
sample compared with Labour and the Conservatives.  
 
When the variables for perception of young people’s level of political competence are 
introduced in the third model, young people’s level of political understanding (1.101) has a 
strong positive effect on support for voting age reform, with perceptions of efficacy (.604) also 
having a smaller positive effect.  However, perception of civic duty among their peers has no 
effect on support. The third and fourth models provide further support that young people 
perceive age-related maturity in a more nuanced way to the electorate. Drawing on our three-
point typology, only support for lowering of other civic age minimums predicts positive support 
for lowering the voting age (2.258). It suggests that young people classify the age of 
enfranchisement as a civic right which is distinct from other protective and autonomous age 
minimums. This contrasts with the adult population who have a more universal view of age 
minimums which is linked to conceptions of adulthood. Overall, while partisanship is clearly 
an influential factor in support for voting age reform amongst 16-17 year-olds, perceptions of 
political efficacy and interest emerge as even more relevant drivers than in the sample of the 
electorate 6.
 






























































5. Discussion and conclusion:  partisan public opinion and votes-at-16 
This article highlights that the drivers and growing strength of support or opposition to lowering 
the voting age are consistent with contemporary partisan political divisions in UK politics, and 
other liberal democracies where debates about lowering the voting age to 16 resonate (see 
Eichhorn and Berghe, 2020). It has been previously argued that public opinion was of only 
marginal relevance to voting age reform in the UK, which had proven a largely elite-driven 
process that the electorate appeared apathetic towards (Cowley and Denver, 2004; Birch et 
al., 2014). Part of the explanation for the marginal role of public opinion in debates about 
Votes-at-16 is that, until now, advocates have been unable to point to evidence showing 
support for the policy among the electorate. Conversely, opponents, have been faced by a 
growing body of evidence showing that young people support Votes-at-16. The relatively low 
levels of support for lowering the voting age and public apathy on the issue in the past 
undoubtedly benefited Votes-at-16 advocates due to the more strident and dynamic nature of 
their activism. 
Such assumptions were less contentious in the period before the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum. However, the effect of the partial introduction of Votes-at-16 in Scotland and 
Wales, together with the political and cultural divisions associated with the 2016 EU 
referendum and the growing resonance of a ‘politics of age’, have seen voting age reform 
become a more salient, politicised and polarised issue. As parties have taken clearer stances 
on Votes-at-16 and as the age of a voter has become a key variable in party choice, so 
attitudes towards voting age reform has become an issue in which party support is highly 
salient. 
This paper concludes that the issue of voting age reform provides qualified additional 
evidence supporting the thesis that an age-related cosmopolitan-communitarian divide is 
reshaping public opinion (Jennings and Stoker, 2017; Sloam and Henn 2018). It also suggests 






























































a deepening political partisanship on the issue. Subsequent studies of public opinion on the 
voting age question appear to confirm our overarching thesis. For example, a British Social 
Attitudes in 2019, demonstrated the age-related linear pattern and strengthening partisan 
trends in support we observe (BSA 2019). A UK-wide survey of public opinion regarding the 
implementation of Votes-at-16 in Wales shows confirms a shift in the support of the over-18 
population, with 42% in favour and 35% against (Redfield and Wilton Strategies, 2020).
 
Our analysis does not provide a test of directionality, and it is plausible a two-way causal 
relationship exists between partisanship and support for Votes-at-16. However, the evidence 
from our surveys that public opinion is strengthening and increasingly polarised appears 
linked to concerted efforts to further politicise the issue. An unsuccessful attempt at 
Westminster to enfranchise 16 and 17 year-olds for the 2019 UK general election led one 
Conservative MP to declare his party would fight such a voting age reduction ‘tooth and nail’ 
(McGrath, 2019). Moreover, Boris Johnson, elected UK Prime Minister in December 2019, 
has publicly stated his opposition to Votes-at-16 at Westminster. This means that although 
reform of the voting age for UK elections is currently highly unlikely, debate about the issue is 
likely to further divide political and public opinion.
This noted, advocates of lowering the voting age can take heart from the substantial support 
shown for Votes-at-16 in our youth sample and from the mounting evidence of an increase in 
support among the electorate. It is striking however that our analysis shows that support is 
especially high among those already politically interested, university-educated, and from 
higher socio-economic backgrounds and those with more positive views of young people’s 
capacities to understand politics and influence change. We found less support for lowering 
the voting age amid those from lower income backgrounds holding few qualifications. These 
relationships demonstrate that Votes-at-16 is a policy that is primarily popular with those who 
already have a positive view of the efficacy and capacity of young people. Change might also 
risk empowering mainly the already advantaged without support for those who feel 






























































marginalised by electoral politics and less confident about participating in the political process. 
Voting age reform would be usefully accompanied by delivery of statutory democratic or 
political education, better engagement from political parties, and improved processes around 
registration.  It is interesting that education level had such a surprisingly minor influence in 
our multi-variate analysis. This is a finding that should be treated with caution, given the 
substantial evidence of strong education effects elsewhere in the literature especially as it 
cannot be plausibly accounted for by the mediation effect of age. However, it does appear 
that views of young people’s efficacy and competency may be more important than 
educational effects on the voting age issue at least. 
 
Finally, our findings also demonstrate that young people’s perceptions of the voting age 
debate may have different parameters to those often expressed by advocates and opponents.  
We show that, in contrast to adult supporters of lowering the voting age, the youth sample did 
not associate voting rights with perceptions of adulthood or young people’s sense of civic 
duty. This finding challenges the traditional parameters of the debate which are usually 
determined by disagreements about when adulthood begins, with voting assumed to be an 
‘adult act’.  The overall strength of the variables related to young people’s political efficacy in 
our models is consistent with arguments for voting age reform based on the capacity to raise 
young people’s level of social capital during critical periods of political socialisation (see also 
Eichhorn, 2017; Neundorf and Smets, 2017). Our evidence shows that young people clearly 
have a nuanced conception of transitions to adulthood and the acquisition of voting rights as 
part of this journey. Protagonists of the voting age debate should therefore move on from the 
stale and circular arguments about ‘maturity’ which appear to have little relevance to young 
people themselves. 
Notes






























































1. For further details of this project, please see www.ukvotingage.co.uk
2. Data references in chronological order; NOP/HTV Wales (2003), Ipsos Mori/Electoral 
Commission (2003), YouGov/Sun (2004), YouGov/Citizenship Foundation (2009), 
Jigsaw/YCC (2009), YouGov (2012), British Election Study data used in Birch et al. 
(2014), YouGov (2013), Survation/Sky (2014), ICM/Electoral Commission (2014), 
Panelbase/SNP (2014), Panelbase/Wings Over Scotland (2015), Ipsos Mori (2015). 
YouGov (2017).
3. The Votes-at-16 question was assigned a random placement in the online questionnaire 
order by Survation for each respondent.
4. It is likely that these findings themselves are a function of age with London respondents 
being significantly younger than the survey average while those in the three regions with 
much lower levels of support were older than the average.
5. Private rent was selected as the reference category because the bivariate analysis 
showed these had the strongest levels of support for Votes-at-16.  GCSE was selected 
as the reference category for education because the number of cases for those with No 
Qualifications was below 50. East of England was selected as the reference category as 
it was the UK region showing the highest level of opposition to Votes-at-16 (adjusted to 
East Midlands for the 16/17 Year Old sample).  Re-runs of models with alternative 
reference categories made no difference to the substantive findings of the analysis.
6. Robustness tests for outlier effects and multicollinearity were all within standard 
acceptable margins with no major issues reported that could bias the findings.
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